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Abstract
This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation
of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by sti￿ ing suppliers￿
incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of
larger buyers may both increase suppliers￿incentives for product improvement and
induce suppliers to choose a more e¢ cient technology. The paper also isolates two
di⁄erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount.
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11 Introduction
In many industries, suppliers face increasingly powerful buyers. A prominent example is
the European retailing industry, in particular fast-moving consumer goods. According to
studies of the European Commission (Dobson Consulting 1999) and the OECD (OECD
1999), the grocery retail market in several states of the European Union is now dominated
by a small number of large retailers, which are also increasingly active across borders.1
Consequently, the retailers￿grip on suppliers has played a major role in recent antitrust
cases in Europe (e.g., Kesko/Tuko and Carrefour/Promodes).2 In the UK, this has led
to the introduction of a Code of Practice that is supposed to regulate contracts between
large retailers and their suppliers (Competition Commission 2000).3
Though market concentration in retailing is less extreme in the US, recently there
have been increasing concerns about retail mergers and buyer power (e.g., FTC 2001).
Casual evidence also suggests that suppliers￿bargaining power has eroded in numerous
other manufacturing industries such as automobiles as well as in service industries such
as healthcare (e.g., Gaynor and Haas-Wilson 1999).
Judging from the aforementioned policy reports, antitrust authorities seem to be par-
ticularly concerned that the formation of larger and stronger buyers sti￿ es suppliers￿
incentives to invest in product and process innovation. Buyer power is thought to force
manufacturers ￿to reduce investment in new products or product improvements, advertis-
ing and brand building￿(Dobson Consulting 1999, p. 4). Consumers, it is feared, ￿could
be adversely a⁄ected by the exercise of buyer power in the longer run, if prices to suppliers
are reduced below a competitive level and if the suppliers respond by under-investing in
innovation or production￿(FTC 2000, p. 57).4
The aim of this paper is to critically assess the view that, by extracting more pro￿ts
from suppliers, buyer power necessarily reduces suppliers￿incentives for product improve-
ment and process innovation and, thereby, reduces welfare. We address this issue in a
model where buyer power is derived endogenously. In Particular, we focus on a buyer￿ s
1As reported in Dobson (2002), after a series of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the top ten
retailers in the EU account now for more than 30% of food sales.
2Kesko/Tuko (EC/DGIV, 1999, Case No. IV/M.784) and Carrefour/Promodes (EC/DGIV, 2000,
Case No. COMP/M.1684). In the UK, buyer power was also an important consideration in the recent
￿nding against the acquisition of Safeway by one of the other three big retailers (Competition Commission
2003). The ￿ndings of the Competition Commission revealed, amongst other things, a signi￿cant inverse
correlation between the prices paid by multiple grocery retailers and their share of total purchases.
3A similar code, though on a voluntary basis, was recently drafted in Australia (ACCC 2001).
4While such concerns have been mainly expressed in the case of retailing, the US health service is
another industry where the impact of buyer power on quality and investment has been addressed (e.g.,
Pitofsky 1997).
2size as the main determinant of his bargaining power. While we show that - under rel-
atively standard assumptions - the formation of larger buyers reduces suppliers￿pro￿ts,
this may actually increase their incentives.
Precisely, we consider a simple model where a single supplier serves a ￿xed number
of downstream ￿rms, all of which serve independent markets.5 Contracts are determined
in bilateral negotiations. Abstracting from other sources of power di⁄erentials between
sellers and buyers, we study the formation of larger buyers. The ￿rst step in the analysis
is to show that, under relatively standard conditions, larger buyers can indeed obtain a
discount.6 In a second step, we analyze how the formation of larger buyers a⁄ects the
supplier￿ s incentives. Hence, our model comprises both an analysis of the origins of buyer
power and an analysis of its (welfare) consequences.
We can isolate two channels of buyer power. First, if revenues at downstream ￿rms
are concave, we show that the supplier￿ s loss from a disagreement increases more than
proportionally with the size of the respective buyer. The threat to withhold demand
is thus more e⁄ective for larger buyers, allowing them to obtain a discount. Second, if
the supplier￿ s costs are convex, the quantity purchased by a larger buyer spans a wider
interval of production, reducing the average incremental cost incurred by serving this
buyer in addition to all other buyers. Again, this allows a larger buyer to obtain a
discount. Our subsequent analysis of the supplier￿ s incentives follows these two channels
of buyer power. For product innovation, the ￿rst channel, building on the concavity of
revenues, is important. For process innovation, it is the second channel, building on the
convexity of the supplier￿ s costs.
If a supplier faces fewer but larger buyers, his outside option in negotiations is more
valuable the better he can cope with being cut out from a large fraction of the total market
following a disagreement. This in turn is the case if a relatively large increase in the supply
to all remaining markets does not substantially reduce the prevailing price and, thereby,
total revenues. We show that a supplier￿ s optimal response to the formation of larger
buyers may then be more product innovation. Regarding the choice of technology, we
show that in bilateral negotiations with large buyers a supplier can ￿roll over￿relatively
less of his incremental costs at high (or ￿marginal￿ ) quantities and relatively more of his
incremental costs at low (or ￿inframarginal￿ ) quantities. Consequently, in the presence
5The formation of larger buyers may often have no or little impact on downstream competition. For
instance, the merging companies may serve geographically di⁄erent markets. In the case of retailing,
merging retailers may also have to divest outlets in overlapping markets (e.g., Balto 1999).
6Bilateral negotiations and individual discounts stand in contrast to the ￿textbook￿view of monop-
sonistic power (e.g., Blair and Harrison 1993 or Scherer and Ross 1990, Chapter 14). Our view on the
exercise of buyer power follows, for instance, OECD (1981), which de￿nes buyer power as the ability of
strong buyers to obtain more favorable terms (see also FTC 2001).
3of larger buyers the supplier has more incentives to choose a production technology with
lower incremental costs at high quantities. Importantly, this is likely to increase welfare as
it tends to increase output, which is typically ine¢ ciently low from a welfare perspective.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on buyer power. A larger buyer can
obtain a discount as he can more credibly threaten to integrate backwards (Katz 1987)7,
as he may break collusion among suppliers (Snyder 1995), or if the supplier is risk averse
(DeGraba 2003). In von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Dobson and Waterson (1997), and
Mazzarotto (2003) a supplier loses bargaining power by the merger of two competing
downstream ￿rms8, while in Inderst and Sha⁄er (2003) a downstream merger facilitates
the switch to a single-sourcing strategy, which increases upstream competition. The role of
the curvature of the surplus function has been recognized in a number of papers, including
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996) for negotiations between ￿rms
and workers and Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and Wey (2003) for negotiations
between buyers and sellers. The latter two papers have focused on the role of convex
costs - our second channel of buyer power. On the other side, the demand-side channel
of buyer power has not been recognized so far due to several restrictions employed in
di⁄erent papers, namely the consideration of at most two buyers, single-unit supply, or
quantity-forcing contracts.9
The major focus of this paper is, however, on the consequences of buyer power. Here,
our major contribution is to question the prevailing view that the presence of more power-
ful buyers reduces suppliers￿incentives. In essence we criticize this view on two accounts.
First, it is necessary to model buyer power from primitives, i.e., to clearly identify what
are the origins of buyer power. In this paper, it is a buyer￿ s size that allows him to obtain
better terms.10 (See, however, the conclusion for alternatives.) Second, while a supplier￿ s
ttotal pro￿ts may be the key determinant of some large-scale investment decisions, e.g.,
7Fumagalli and Motta (2000) extend this by modelling the co-ordination problem among small buyers.
8A somewhat symmetric situation arises in O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (2003), who consider mergers between
upstream ￿rms that sell substitutes to a downstream monopolist. They show that a horizontal merger
has only an impact on equilibrium quantities and payo⁄s if the merged ￿rm can not negotiate jointly
over the supply of all controlled goods.
9We discuss the limitations of quantity-forcing contracts in some detail in Section 4. Chipty and
Snyder (1999) consider Nash negotiations over quantity-forcing contracts. The special case where buyers
have all bargaining power is considered in the experimental paper by Normann, Ru› e, and Snyder (2003).
Inderst and Wey (2003) use the Shapley value and consider a bilateral duopoly, for which they study
the equilbrium market structure and the choice between two linear production technologies. Incidentally,
with the Shapley value convex costs are not su¢ cient to generate large-buyer discounts for arbitrary
numbers of buyers with di⁄erent size.
10The alternative model would be to just assume that a more powerful buyer can capture a larger
share of the surplus. In our model, this would be equivalent to increasing the buyer￿ s weight in the Nash
bargaining solution.
4market entry, for many other ttypes of more incremental investment decisions total pro￿ts
provide a very misleading picture. Modelling buyer power from principles and focusing
on more incremental decisions, we can identify reasonable cases where buyer power may
actually spur suppliers￿incentives. The analysis of supplier￿ s incentives relates to the
hold-up literature (Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986). In di⁄erent contexts, this lit-
erature has more recently shown that hold-up may even increase incentives, depending on
how the investment a⁄ects the party￿ s outside option (e.g., DeMeza and Lockwood 1998,
Chiu 1998). While this is reminiscent of our discussion of product innovation, the novelty
of our analysis is the interaction of the supplier￿ s incentives with the number and size of
buyers.11 Moreover, while some papers in the hold-up literature analyze buyer competi-
tion (e.g., Felli and Roberts 2001), they typically consider only bilateral matches and the
supply of a single unit, which does not allow to capture most of the e⁄ects highlighted in
this paper.12
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
conditions for when larger buyers obtain a discount. Section 3 applies these results to
study the supplier￿ s incentives. Section 4 discusses the chosen bargaining solution. Section
5 concludes.
2 A Model of Buyer Power
2.1 The Economy
We consider a single supplier producing the quantity x of some input. The supplier￿ s
production technology is described by the twice continuously di⁄erentiable cost function
C(x) with C(0) = 0. We allow both for the case where x is unconstrained and for the
case where the supplier￿ s capacity has an upper boundary denoted by X. Inputs are
used by N ￿ 2 downstream ￿rms. For simplicity, we assume that the downstream ￿rms￿
technology converts each unit of the supplier￿ s input into a unit of the ￿nal good at zero
additional costs. The N downstream ￿rms serve N independent markets characterized by
the same inverse demand function P(x), which satis￿es P(0) > 0 and is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable and strictly decreasing where positive. We denote revenues generated at each
outlet by R(x) := xp(x). The speci￿cation of the simple production technology and the
11In Stole and Zwiebel (1996) a ￿rm that negotiates with its workers without commitment can choose
its production technology to enhance its bargaining position.
12In addition, Spulber (2002) studies how incentives to invest depend on the market microstructure,
while Kranton and Minehart (2000) analyze incentives to invest into the exchange network. The inter-
action of market structure and investment incentives has also been studied in the literature on vertical
integration (e.g., Bolton and Whinston 1993).
5symmetry assumption are made to facilitate the exposition of our results. The restriction
to independent markets for ￿nal goods allows us to focus exclusively on the input market
(see also footnote 5 above).
Some downstream outlets may belong to the same owner. Given symmetry of outlets,
the market for inputs is thus fully described by specifying the number of outlets ri that
are controlled by the same buyer (or owner) i = 1;:::;I. Note that
PI
i=1 ri = N.
2.2 Negotiations
Each buyer negotiates separately with the supplier. We allow bilateral contracts to be
su¢ ciently complex to rule out problems of double marginalization. A contract with
buyer i, who purchases inputs for ri ￿rms (or markets), speci￿es a menu of prices ti(x) as a
function of the supplied quantity x.13 It proves convenient to subsequently let the supplier
choose a vector of quantities from the respective menus. As there is no uncertainty, in
equilibrium each buyer will receive a deterministic quantity. We denote this choice by ￿ xi
and the respective transfer by ￿ ti = ti(￿ xi). The supplier￿ s agents, i.e., his various ￿account
managers￿ , negotiate simultaneously and independently over the respective menu ti(x),
forming rational expectations about the outcomes in all other negotiations. The transfer
￿ ti is chosen such that the respective buyer receives the fraction ￿ 2 (0;1] of the generated
net surplus.14
Our speci￿cations do not yet fully pin down a unique equilibrium. This follows as,
given the deterministic nature of the model, transfers ti(x) for all quantities x 6= ￿ xi are
irrelevant in equilibrium. They are, however, relevant o⁄ equilibrium as they determine
the supplier￿ s outside option if there is disagreement with an individual buyer. We now
require that ti(x) is chosen to truthfully re￿ ect the valuation of the respective buyer i. To
formalize this speci￿cation, note ￿rst that, by optimality, buyer i will allocate a supplied
quantity x symmetrically over all ri markets. Hence, to truthfully re￿ ect the buyer￿ s
valuation, ti(x) must for all quantities x0 and x00 satisfy the requirement15
ti(x
00) ￿ ti(x
0) = ri [R(x
00=ri) ￿ R(x
0=ri)]. (1)
13An example would be a percentage quantity discount, where the size of the discount is a function
of total sales to a particular buyer. For instance, contracts with retailers are often highly complex,
specifying promotional allowances, volume discounts, up-front or pay-to-stay fees, or the provision of
additional services by the supplier. The choice of menus in supply contracts is common in the literature.
See, for instance, O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997, 2003).
14Hence, we make use of a hybrid solution concept, employing the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
to determine how total surplus is split.
15For the truthfulness requirement see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
6The truthfulness requirement seems reasonable for a number of reasons. As we show
below, it implies that supplies are chosen to maximize industry pro￿ts both on and o⁄
equilibrium, i.e., both if all negotiations were successful and in case there was disagreement
with a subset of buyers. Hence, there is never scope for mutually bene￿cial renegotiations.
(In Section 4 we discuss alternative speci￿cations, where this does not hold.) An alterna-
tive way to justify the truthfulness requirement would be to appeal to ex-ante uncertainty
about some unveri￿able parameter of the supplier￿ s cost function. The truthfulness re-
quirement then ensure that, regardless of the realization of the uncertain cost parameter,
the chosen quantity xi maximizes the bilateral surplus.16
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is useful to note that in our model buyers negotiate
separately with the supplier and can, therefore, obtain di⁄erent deals. This is clearly a
prerequisite for the exercise of buyer power, i.e., for larger buyers to obtain more favorable
terms.17
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
To state our results in a convenient way, we need some additional notation. Suppose the
supplier serves only n out of the total N downstream ￿rms. Suppose also that, given this
restriction, quantities are always chosen to maximize total industry pro￿ts. It is further
convenient to assume that the total quantity that maximizes industry surplus is uniquely
determined and strictly positive. For given n, we denote the optimal quantity by x￿
n and




industry pro￿ts are denoted by ￿￿
n := nR￿
n ￿ C(x￿
n). Though it is only economically
meaningful to consider discrete values n ￿ 1, note that ￿￿
n is de￿ned for all positive real
values. This will be convenient for some of our results.
By the truthfulness requirement, the supplier fully internalizes all incremental rev-
enues and costs when choosing his production volume and supplies. As a consequence, in
equilibrium he produces the total quantity x￿
N and supplies ￿ xi = x￿
Nri=N to buyer i. The
analogous results holds in case of disagreement with a subset of buyers.
Lemma 1. If there is agreement with a (sub)set of buyers I0 ￿ I, the total quantity
16The use of uncertainty to pin down equilibrium menus in this way is well known in the literature and
used, for instance, in the seminal work of Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and, relying on ex-ante private
information, by Martimort and Stole (2003).
17While such discounts may o⁄end the spirit of the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act, antitrust authorities
and courts seem to have become less eager to enforce it in a narrow sense. An illustrative case, which is
discussed in Scherer and Ross (1990), is that of the retailer A&P in 1979. A&P threatened to withdraw
its demand from the milk producer Borden unless it obtained a su¢ ciently large discount. Even though
the discount gave A&P a substantial cost advantage compared to other buyers, it was not objected in
the ￿nal court decision.
7x￿
n is produced, where n =
P
i2I0 ri. Moreover, buyer i 2 I0 receives the quantity x￿
nri=n.
Note that, as an implication of Lemma 1, the downstream market structure has no
implications for equilibrium quantities. We obtain next the following result for equilibrium
payo⁄s.
Proposition 1. A buyer controlling ri outlets obtains the fraction ￿ of his respective
incremental contribution to total industry pro￿ts, i.e., he realizes the payo⁄ ￿[￿￿
N￿￿￿
N￿ri].















Note that for ￿ = 0, where the supplier has all bargaining power, his own pro￿ts are
just equal to total industry pro￿ts, ￿￿
N. At the other extreme, where ￿ = 1, each buyer
can extract his full net contribution. As can be easily seen, the outcome for ￿ = 1 is
equivalent to that of a ￿rst-price auction where buyers bid with truthful menus.
The derivation of Proposition 1 comes with one caveat. It is assumed that the sup-
plier￿ s pro￿ts in (2) are non-negative. This is surely the case if industry pro￿ts ￿￿
n are
concave in n. Below we derive conditions when this holds. Moreover, we speci￿ed that
a buyer realizes zero pro￿ts in case of a disagreement. It is, however, straightforward
to allow for the presence of some (inferior) alternative source of supply. Precisely, if an
alternative source of supply generated the pro￿ts U ￿ 0 at each ￿rm, buyer i￿ s payo⁄
would transform to ￿[￿￿
N ￿ ￿￿
N￿ri] + (1 ￿ ￿)riU.
2.4 The Origins of Buyer Power
Using Proposition 1, we now ask when a larger buyer can obtain a more favorable deal.
Denote by ￿i the average (or unit) price paid by buyer i. From Proposition 1 we obtain
that the buyer￿ s margin equals
P(x
￿
















creases in the number of controlled ￿rms ri. Note that in this case a merger between
buyers is also strictly pro￿table and reduces the supplier￿ s pro￿ts. An alternative - and
less extreme - way to form a larger buyer is the sale of assets (￿rms) by a smaller buyer
to a larger buyer. If buyer i sells to buyer j the number r of ￿rms, where rj ￿ ri ￿ r,
8straightforward calculations from Proposition 1 reveal that this makes the supplier strictly

















As is easily seen, it is su¢ cient to require that total industry pro￿ts ￿￿
n are strictly con-
cave in the number of ￿rms n.18 We have thus arrived at the following implications of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. If total industry pro￿ts are strictly concave in the number of served
￿rms, a larger buyer gets a discount, which is higher the larger his share of the supplier￿ s
business. Formally, ri > rj implies ￿i < ￿j. Moreover, the supplier is strictly worse o⁄
after the creation of a larger buyer, either through a complete merger or through a partial
sale of assets (￿rms).
The role of the concavity of ￿￿
n is intuitive. If ￿￿
n is concave, a buyer￿ s net contribution
to industry pro￿ts increases more than proportionally with his size. We next relate the
shape of industry pro￿ts to the characteristics of ￿nal demand and the characteristics of
the supplier￿ s technology.
Demand Characteristics
To isolate the demand-side channel of buyer power, suppose the supplier has zero
product costs and only low capacity X such that ￿￿
n = nR(X=n) for all n. Consequently,
if negotiations with some buyer i break down, the supplier shifts the freed-up capacity to
the remaining N ￿ ri ￿rms. As demand is strictly decreasing, this reduces the ￿nal price
and ultimately reduces revenues by the amount
NR(X=N) ￿ (N ￿ ri)R(X=(N ￿ ri)). (5)
Recall now that, due to the truthfulness requirement, the supplier fully bears this
loss in revenues. Consequently, a larger buyer obtains a more favourable deal if the loss
in￿ icted by breakdown of negotiations increases more than proportionally with the buyer￿ s
size, ri. As is easily checked from (5) - and formalized below - this holds if revenues R(x)
are strictly concave.
Incidentally, the notion that larger buyers have more bargaining power as they can
in￿ ict a more than proportional damage on a seller by withholding demand was used
in the consideration of Aetna￿ s acquisition of Prudential￿ s health insurance assets in the
18Formally, using that ￿￿
n is twice continuously di⁄erentiable given the assumptions on P(x), C(x),
and x￿












9U.S.19 Our model shows that this e⁄ect arises under the relatively standard conditions of
concave revenues.
Technology Characteristics
To isolate this channel of buyer power, suppose that at each ￿rm the quantity ~ x > 0
can be sold at any price that does not exceed ~ p > 0, while it is not possible to further
increase sales by lowering the price. Furthermore, ~ x is su¢ ciently small to make it always
optimal to serve all available demand. Hence, we now have that ￿￿
n = n~ x~ p￿C(n~ x). When
negotiating with a buyer who controls ri ￿rms, the net surplus created by an agreement
is now
ri~ x~ p ￿ [C(N~ x) ￿ C((N ￿ ri)~ x)],
of which the buyer extracts the fraction ￿. We can decompose the buyer￿ s pro￿ts into the
share ￿ of revenues ri~ x~ p minus the share ￿ of incremental costs C(N~ x) ￿ C((N ￿ ri)~ x).
Given our speci￿cation of demand, revenues now increase only proportionally with the
buyer￿ s size. However, if C(x) is strictly convex, we now ￿nd that the incremental costs
increase less than proportionally with the buyer￿ s size, i.e., [C(N~ x) ￿ C((N ￿ ri)~ x]=ri is
decreasing in ri. In the case of convex costs, we obtain again a discount for large buyers.
Intuitively, a small buyer negotiates more ￿on the margin￿ , where incremental costs are
high. In contrast, the purchase volume of a larger buyer spans a wider production interval,
where average incremental costs are smaller.
Generalization
Using these arguments, we can now ask more generally when the conditions of Corol-
lary 1 are satis￿ed such that a larger buyer obtains a discount.
Proposition 2. We obtain the following su¢ cient conditions for buyer power to arise,
i.e., for Corollary 1 to hold:
(i) It is su¢ cient that the supplier￿ s costs are strictly convex and revenues at down-
stream ￿rms are strictly concave.
(ii) It is also su¢ cient that total capacity is su¢ ciently constrained, while costs are
convex (including linear) and revenues strictly concave.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 2 contains also the following intuitive insights. First, if
revenues R(x) are only linear, i.e., not strictly concave, all buyers obtain the same terms,
19United States, et al. v. Aetna, Inc, et al., No. 3-99CV1398-H (N.D. Tex.) (complaint ￿led June 21,
1999). According to Schwartz (1999, p.8), it was agued that ￿a physician￿ s costs of replacing patients
unexpectedly can increase by more-than-proportionally with the number of patients that must be replaced.
... (T)he physician￿ s increased prospective loss per patient if dropped by Aetna increases Aetna￿ s ability
to force the physician to accept a lower price post merger.￿
10irrespective of the shape of the cost function.20 This is intuitive as a linear revenue
function implies that each ￿rm can sell any quantity (in the relevant range) at a ￿xed
price. With a constant price, however, each buyer is perfectly substitutable without losses
in pro￿ts. Another insight of Proposition 2 is that there is no large-buyer discount if costs
are linear and capacity is not (su¢ ciently) constrained. Intuitively, with unconstrained
supply and linear costs the outcome of individual negotiations is fully independent of
what happens at other negotiations. That is, neither the supplier￿ s incremental costs nor
the optimal quantity depend on the outcomes of other negotiations.
How big is the discount obtained by a larger buyer? By (3) the di⁄erence of margins is
strictly increasing in ￿. That is, the discount increases with the share of the incremental
surplus that is appropriated by each buyer. If ￿ captures all not explicitly modeled factors
in￿ uencing surplus sharing between the supplier and buyers, the large-buyer discount is
thus higher the more powerful buyers already are.
3 Supplier Incentives and Welfare
3.1 General Discussion
We can now build on the identi￿ed two channels of buyer power to investigate the key
question this paper seeks to address: How does the formation of larger and stronger buyers
a⁄ect a supplier￿ s incentives of product and process innovation?
The main assumption in the following analysis is that the supplier￿ s choices are non-
contractible. This may be, for instance, the case as it is hard to ex-ante specify and to
ex-post verify particular changes in the product technology. Likewise, ex-ante contracting
may be di¢ cult due to free-riding or co-ordination problems among the many di⁄erent
buyers. It is now convenient to suppose that the supplier can choose to shift between two
action pro￿les, say from ￿ to ￿, possibly by incurring some additional investment costs.




Take now a given downstream market structure and transform it by shifting assets
(￿rms) away from smaller buyers to larger buyers. (Note that this includes a full merger
of buyers.) If a market structure can be derived from another market structure by a
sequence of such transformations, we say that the former is more concentrated.
Proposition 3. Suppose the downstream market structure becomes more concentrated.
20For instance, we could imagine that each ￿rm is located in a di⁄erent country where it acts as a pure
price taker given the amount that it can procure from the supplier.









Likewise, the supplier￿ s incentives to switch are strictly lower under the more concentrated
market structure if the converse to (6) holds strictly.
Proof. See Appendix.
A supplier￿ s incentives to switch to ￿ depend on the downstream market structure
and on how the switch a⁄ects the curvature of the pro￿t function ￿￿
n. This is intuitive
by our previous discussion. We know that larger buyers extract more of the incremental
surplus at lower values of n, while a small buyer￿ s incremental contribution is right at the
￿margin￿ . If (6) holds, this relatively increases the incremental pro￿ts at higher n, which
would relatively improve the position of smaller buyers. Consequently, in this case the
supplier￿ s incentives to switch to ￿ are muted under a less concentrated market structure.
Unfortunately, Proposition 3 is not very instructive about what kind of activities,
i.e., what kind of process or product innovations, would be dampened or spurred under
di⁄erent downstream market structures. To obtain more insights, we have to be more
speci￿c about how the supplier￿ s alternatives, ￿ and ￿, a⁄ect revenues and costs. We
next study separately the case of product innovation, which a⁄ects the revenue function
R(x) at each ￿rm, and the case of process innovation, which a⁄ects the supplier￿ s cost
function, C(x). At this level, we will also analyze welfare implications.
3.2 The Case of Process Innovation
Suppose the supplier can invest to switch from the cost function C(x;￿) to C(x;￿). It is
helpful to suppose for a moment that we can represent the shift from ￿ to ￿ by a gradual












































Hence, a shift to ￿ satis￿es condition (6) in Proposition 3, i.e., it convexi￿es the
industry pro￿t function, if (7) is strictly positive. The ￿rst term in (7) is in turn strictly
positive if dC00(x￿
n;￿)=d￿ < 0. If we ignored the second term in (7), we could thus say
that the formation of larger buyers induces the supplier to choose a production technology
that has relatively lower incremental costs at high quantities. This is again intuitive from
12our previous results. With each small buyer the supplier can roll over a fraction of his
incremental production costs ￿at the margin￿ , i.e., close to the equilibrium volume x￿
N.
For instance, in the case of N small buyers with ri = 1, the supplier is only compensated
for the incremental costs C(x￿
N) ￿ C(x￿
N￿1).21 In contrast, more of ￿inframarginal￿but
less of ￿marginal￿costs can be rolled over when negotiating with larger buyers.
Unfortunately, there is little general we can say about the sign of the second term in
(7). We therefore illustrate the previous discussion with a particular case: the shift from
a strictly convex to a linear technology.22
Proposition 4. Suppose the supplier can switch - possibly by incurring a strictly
positive investment cost - from some strictly convex cost function C(x;￿) to a linear cost
function C(x;￿). We have the following results:
i) Under a more concentrated market structure, the supplier has strictly higher incen-
tives to switch technologies, i.e., he is willing to incur a higher investment cost.
ii) Whenever the supplier switches, this strictly increases welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1 goes here!
We illustrate the choice between ￿ in ￿ in Figure 1. In the special case of Proposition
4, we can say (i) that the supplier has strictly higher incentives to switch technologies
after the formation of larger buyers and (ii) that this shift in incentives improves welfare.
The second result on welfare is important as it stands in marked contrast to the argu-
ment that the presence of larger buyers reduces welfare by reducing suppliers￿incentives.
For an intuition, note ￿rst that, by standard arguments, industry pro￿ts are maximized
at a quantity x￿
N that is ine¢ ciently low from a welfare perspective. As a reduction of the
marginal production costs at x￿
N leads to an increase in output and consumer surplus, the
welfare maximizing choice between various production technologies should put less weight
on incremental costs at low quantities, i.e. on ￿inframarginal￿costs, and more weight on
21If N￿ > 1, the supplier is in fact over-compensated for this cost increment.
22We can think of ￿ as being more ￿￿ exible￿ , with lower marginal costs at high production volumes.
As can be easily seen, results would not change if we allowed for ￿xed costs and if the more ￿ exible
technology involved higher ￿xed costs. As long as I ￿ 2, all ￿xed costs would be born exclusively by the
supplier.
13incremental costs ￿at the margin￿ . By our previous arguments, this is exactly what the
supplier does if he faces larger buyers, i.e., his incentives shift more towards reducing
marginal costs at high production volumes, which leads to an expansion in quantity and
to higher consumer surplus.
3.3 The Case of Product Innovation
We next consider the supplier￿ s incentives for product innovation. Suppose the supplier
can switch, possibly by incurring additional costs, from a product with inverse demand
P(x;￿) to a product with inverse demand P(x;￿). Again, it is helpful to ￿rst suppose that
this shift is gradual. Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿, and denoting R(x;￿) := xP(x;￿),












































A shift to ￿ satis￿es condition (6) in Proposition 3 and is thus more pro￿table under
a more concentrated market structure if (8) is strictly positive. The ￿rst term in (8) is
strictly positive if the shift to ￿ increases R00(x￿
n=n;￿) < 0. This is once again intuitive as
we know that, in the presence of larger buyers, the supplier￿ s bargaining position depends
crucially on sustaining high revenues even if substantially more than the equilibrium
quantity was supplied at some ￿rms after a disagreement with a large buyer. In contrast,
with small buyers the revenue function matters only relatively close to the equilbrium
quantities, i.e., in the right-side neighborhood of x￿
N=N.
Again, we can not generally sign the second term on the right side of (8) and, therefore,
proceed with a speci￿c case. In a slight deviation from our original set-up, we now suppose
that a downstream ￿rm can use the input x to produce heterogeneous products. The more
￿versatile￿the supplier￿ s input is made, the more heterogeneous are the ￿nal products,
which expands demand. Precisely, suppose that at each ￿rm ￿ ￿ 1 products can be
supplied. If xj
n denotes the supply of good 1 ￿ j ￿ ￿ at ￿rm n ￿ N, prices are given by
p
j







n with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: (9)
One unit of the supplier￿ s input is required to produce one unit of product j. For ￿ < 1,
symmetry implies that a ￿rm optimally allocates a given supply x in equal fractions
14among the ￿ di⁄erent products. (For ￿ = 1; the allocation is irrelevant as goods are
homogeneous.) Consequently, by the inverse demand system (9) the supply of x to any









Using (10), we can apply all our previous results. Denote now   := [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿]=￿
such that R(x) = x(1 ￿  x). Note that   is strictly lower the more heterogeneous (￿)
and the more numerous (￿) are the uses of the supplier￿ s input. We capture product
innovation by letting the supplier switch at costs from ￿ and ￿, where  ￿ <  ￿. To focus
on the role of the revenue side, we suppose that the supplier has linear costs, C(x) = cx,
but that capacity is su¢ ciently small (see Proposition 2).
Proposition 5. Consider the linear example where the supplier can switch at costs
from the less versatile product ￿ to the more versatile product ￿. We have the following
results:
i) Under a more concentrated market structure, the supplier has strictly higher incen-
tives to switch technologies, i.e., he is willing to incur higher costs to switch.
ii) The supplier￿ s incentives to switch are always ine¢ ciently high, implying that a
more concentrated market structure may reduce welfare by increasing the supplier￿ s incen-
tives.
Proof. See Appendix.
With a more versatile input, revenues at all quantities are higher, but the e⁄ect is
stronger at large quantities. This, in turn, increases relatively more the supplier￿ s outside
option when negotiating with large buyers. In contrast to the case of process innovation
in Proposition 4, however, higher incentives for the supplier are now not bene￿cial. In
our example, we ￿nd that the supplier has always ine¢ ciently high incentives to innovate,
which are further distorted by the presence of larger buyers. In this sense, the conjecture
that buyer power reduces welfare by a⁄ecting the supplier￿ s incentives is true, but this is
only by accident as it involves two errors: (i) the supplier￿ s incentives actually increase,
but (ii) higher incentives are bad for welfare.23
23In contrast to the case of process innovation, we have, however, no good guidance as to whether an
increase in incentives is more likely to increase or to reduce welfare. This is a well known problem in the
literature on product innovation (e.g., Spence 1975, 1976).
154 Discussion of the Bargaining Solutions
Our chosen bargaining solution has two major features. First, as negotiations are over
menus, disagreement with any individual buyer i leads to the adjustment of supplies
to other buyers j 6= i. Second, by the truthfulness requirement the supplier captures all
incremental surplus from these adjustments.24 In what follows, we discuss the importance
of these two assumptions.
Suppose ￿rst that adjustments are not possible after a disagreement. That is, negoti-
ations with each buyer i are over quantity-forcing contracts, specifying a transfer ti and
a ￿xed quantity xi. There exists an equilibrium in which buyer i purchases the quan-
tity ri(x￿
N=N), which maximizes total industry surplus.25 This quantity is una⁄ected by
whether the supplier￿ s negotiations with other buyers were successful. The transfer ti is





















By (11) and our previous arguments we now have that convex costs are su¢ cient for
large buyers to obtain a discount, regardless of the curvature of revenues. In fact, with
quantity-forcing contracts only the cost-side channel of buyer power exists.26 This is in-
tuitive as the supplier realizes the same revenues riR(x￿=N) with buyer i regardless of
whether he was successful in negotiating with all other buyers or whether some negoti-
ations resulted in disagreement. Consequently, with quantity-forcing contracts only our
insights on the supplier￿ s incentives for process innovation are preserved,27 while down-
stream market structure has no impact on product innovation.
An unattractive feature of quantity-forcing contracts is that, in case of diasgreement
with some buyer i, the supplier is still constrained to ship exactly the quantities rjx￿
N=N
to all other j 6= i buyers. Unless capacity is constrained and costs are linear, this may
be widely ine¢ cient. In the remainder of this section we argue that renegotiations again
open up the demand-side channel of buyer power. For a formal analysis of renegotiations,
we continue to assume that in any round of (re-)negotiations a buyer receives the fraction
￿ of the respective net surplus.
24As noted previously, these two features also ensure that supplies always maximize total industry
pro￿ts, regardless of which negotiations were successful.
25Uniqueness can be ensured by, for instance, requiring that costs are convex and revenues concave. This
is reminiscent of conditions imposed in O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (2003), who consider negotiations between a
single buyer and several suppliers.
26We thank a referee for suggesting this discussion.
27In particular, it is easy to see that Proposition 4 still holds.
16In case of renegotiations, the parties do not start from scratch, but each side has al-
ways recourse to the previously signed contract (ti;xi).28 The fact that previously signed
contracts act as outside options heavily complicates the analysis. In fact, allowing for ar-
bitrary rounds of renegotiations, following any further disagreements, turns out to become
quickly intractable as the number of buyers (of di⁄erent size) increases. Consequently, we
restrict attention to only a single round of renegotiations. That is, following disagreement
at the renegotiation stage, there is no further recontracting. In Appendix B we solve
for equilibrium pro￿ts and show that the demand-side channel of buyer power is again
present, while also Proposition 5 continues to hold. These results are again intuitive.
Following disagreement with some buyers, supply contracts with the remaining buyers
are optimally adjusted and the supplier captures the fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the newly created
surplus.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of the formation of larger buyers on a supplier￿ s pro￿ts
and, thereby, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We ￿rst isolate two
sources of buyer power. If revenues at each downstream market are strictly concave,
larger buyers can threaten the supplier with a loss in revenues that grows more than
proportionally with the buyer￿ s size. If production costs are convex, additional costs
incurred by serving an individual buyer increase less than proportionally with the buyer￿ s
size
While the presence of larger buyers reduces the supplier￿ s pro￿ts, we argue that his
incentives to undertake product or process innovation could in fact increase. Facing larger
buyers, the supplier￿ s bargaining position is enhanced if incremental costs are relatively
lower at high production volumes and if incremental revenues are relatively higher at large
supplies to individual markets. As, for instance, a reduction in marginal costs at high
output levels may lead to an increase in supply - in contrast to a reduction in inframarginal
costs - a supplier facing larger buyers may invest more in a production technology that
increases total welfare.
This paper focuses squarely on buyers￿size as the sole determinant of buyer power.
Depending on the application, individual buyers may be able to obtain a discount for
28This stands in contrast to an approach adopted by deFontenay and Gans (2001). In the spirit
of worker-￿rm bargaining in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), it is assumed that any individual disagreement
makes existing contracts void and leads to fresh negotiations. This approach yields the Shapley value.
Interestingly, it can be shown that convex costs and concave demand are not su¢ cient to generally obtain
a large-buyer discount under the Shapley value.
17di⁄erent reasons. For instance, in retailing buyers who stock private-label goods may
have a distinctive advantage when negotiating with particular suppliers. Likewise, in
certain industries more sophisticated buyers may switch to new procurement strategies,
e.g., based on B2B platforms. Buyer power derived from such di⁄erent sources may have
entirely new and di⁄erent e⁄ects on suppliers￿incentives. One insight of the present paper
is that any sweeping generalization about the ￿general￿impact of buyer power may be
highly misleading. Instead, we would argue that a thorough analysis of the (welfare)
implications of buyer power requires a precise speci￿cation of its sources.
An alternative route to pursue is to introduce non-contractible (investment) choices
of buyers. This would be a natural consideration if buyers are themselves manufacturers,
who use the supplier￿ s product as an input.
6 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We denote the supplier￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ by U￿ and that
of buyer i by V ￿
i for i 2 I. Moreover, if there is no agreement with a subset I0 ￿ I, the
supplier realizes U￿(I0). By Lemma 1, we know that the vector of supplies to all buyers
with whom an agreement was reached is chosen to maximize industry pro￿ts.
Take now negotiations with some buyer i. In case of disagreement, buyer i realizes
















Substituting from the truthfulness requirement (1), we know that tj(x￿
N￿rirj=(N ￿
rj)) is the sum of ￿ tj and the di⁄erence in revenues: rj[R(x￿
N￿ri=(N ￿ rj)) ￿ R(x￿
N=N)].
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￿







Note next that total surplus in the negotiations with i is equal to
X
j2Infig









Subtracting the supplier￿ s outside option U￿(i) in (13) from the total surplus after
disagreement with i in (14), we have the net surplus ￿￿
N ￿￿￿
N￿ri. As the buyer￿ s outside









obtain for U￿ the result in (2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. In what follows, it is convenient to treat n as a continuous
variable. Take ￿rst case (i) where capacity is unconstrained. It is now convenient to
denote ~ xn = x￿
n=n, which is given by the ￿rst-order condition R0(~ xn) ￿ C0(n~ xn) = 0.





R00(~ xn) ￿ nC00(n~ xn)
. (15)
We next di⁄erentiate industry pro￿ts ￿￿
n = n~ xnp(~ xn) ￿ C(n~ xn) with respect to n. Using
the envelope theorem, we obtain d￿￿
n=dn = ~ xn[p(~ xn)￿C0(n~ xn)]. Di⁄erentiating a second

















R00(~ xn) ￿ nC00(n~ xn)
,
which is strictly negative if revenues are strictly concave and costs are strictly convex.
For assertion (ii) note ￿rst that if capacity is su¢ ciently constrained, the optimal choice
satis￿es x￿
n = X for all n. Industry pro￿ts are then given by ￿￿
n = nR(X=n) ￿ C(X).
Di⁄erentiating twice yields in this case d￿￿
n=dn = R(X=n)￿XR0(X=n)=n and d2￿￿
n=dn =
X2R00(X=n)=n3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. If it costs K to switch, for a given market structure there
is a threshold K such that the supplier prefers to switch if K < K and prefers not to
switch if K > K.29 By de￿nition, the transition to a more concentrated market structure
can be decomposed into individual transactions where some buyer i sells to some buyer j
the number r of ￿rms with rj ￿ ri ￿ r. By (4) this transformation changes the supplier￿ s






























29We allow also for K < 0,
19If (6) is satis￿ed, we have from (18) that ￿ is strictly higher under ￿ than under ￿.
If this holds, the supplier￿ s loss from the change in the downstream market structure is
smaller under ￿, implying ￿nally that the respective threshold K is strictly higher under
the more concentrated market structure. If the converse to (6) holds strictly, we have
that ￿ is strictly smaller after the shift, implying that K is strictly lower under the more
concentrated market structure. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. As in the proof of Proposition 3, we want to show that
(17) is strictly higher after the switch in technologies, which implies that the respective
threshold K is strictly larger under the more concentrated market structure. With the
linear technology ￿ and unconstrained capacity, we have that (17) is equal to zero. Finally,
for the strictly convex technology ￿ we know that, under the conditions of Proposition 2,
(17) is strictly negative.
To complete the proof of Proposition 4 it remains to show that, whenever the supplier
switches technologies, this strictly improves welfare. We denote the welfare realized under
the pro￿t-maximizing choice of supplies by W ￿
N := N
R ~ xN
0 P(x)dx￿C(N~ xN).30 Note next
that, by our previous results, the supplier￿ s incentives to switch are greatest under the
most concentrated market structure. In this case, i.e., for N = 1, the supplier realizes
the pro￿ts (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
N and we thus have that ￿￿
N(￿) ￿ ￿￿
N(￿) + K. If we denote the
respective levels of welfare by W ￿
N(￿) and W ￿
N(￿), respectively, it thus remains to show
that ￿￿
N(￿) ￿ ￿￿
N(￿)+K implies W ￿
N(￿) > W ￿









[P(x) ￿ P(~ xN(￿))]dx > N
Z ~ xN(￿)
0
[P(x) ￿ P(~ xN(￿))]dx, (19)
where ~ xN(￿) and ~ xN(￿) denote the respective equilibrium supplies to individual ￿rms. For
(19) to hold, we need that ~ xN(￿) > ~ xN(￿). This, however, follows immediately from the
fact that C0(N~ xN(￿);￿) < C0(N~ xN(￿);￿), which again holds as C(x;￿) is linear, C(x;￿)




Proof of Proposition 5. We adopt again the steps from Propositions 3 and 4. As
capacity X is su¢ ciently constrained, we have ￿￿
n = X(1 ￿  X=n) ￿ cX. The di⁄erence
(17) then transforms to

















30We assume that P(x) is generated by the utility of a representative consumer. Also, note that W￿
N is
not the maximum feasible welfare. Our objective is to compare welfare under the two technologies given
the equilibrium levels of supply.
20As 0 <  ￿ <  ￿ and as ￿ < 0, we have that ￿ is strictly higher under ￿ than under ￿.
Consequently, the respective threshold K is strictly higher under the more concentrated
market structure.
Regarding welfare, as is standard we assume that at each ￿rm the linear inverse de-
mand function is generated by the quadratic utility function of a representative consumer.
That is, if xj























In equilibrium, we know that all quantities are chosen symmetrically, i.e., that xj
n =
X=(N ). Substitution of   = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿]=￿ yields the welfare W = X(1 ￿ 1
2
X
N  ￿ c).






( ￿ ￿  ￿): (21)
We now compare KW with the respective threshold chosen by the supplier. By our
previous result, we know that K is lowest for the supplier if the downstream market is
least concentrated, i.e., if I = N and ri = 1. Using (2) in Proposition 1 for the supplier￿ s








which is still strictly higher than the threshold KW in (21). This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
7 Appendix B: Quantity-forcing Contracts with Rene-
gotiations
We ￿rst derive equilibrium payo⁄s. In equilibrium, buyer i purchases the quantity rix￿
N=N.
If there is breakdown with buyer i in the ￿rst-round negotiations, renegotiations lead to
￿nal sales of the quantities rjx￿
N￿ri=(N ￿ ri) to buyers j 6= i. Denote now again the
equilibrium payo⁄of the supplier by U￿ and that of buyer i by V ￿
i . If there is break-down
with buyer i, the supplier￿ s resulting payo⁄ is U￿(i) and each of the remaining buyers
j 6= i realizes Vj(i). (In what follows it is not necessary to specify payo⁄s for when there
is breakdown with more than one buyer.) If renegotiations are successful with all buyers
but i, denote the net surplus achieved by additionally renegotiating the original contract


















while surplus sharing under renegotiations implies
V
￿
j (i) ￿ V
￿









j (i) for all i 2 I:

































































































As noted in the main text, we con￿ne ourselves to the derivation of two results: (i)
the illustration of the demand-side channel of buyer power with ￿xed and su¢ ciently
small capacity (as in Proposition 2) and (ii) the extension of Proposition 5 to the new
bargaining solution.
Assume thus that costs are linear with C(x) = cx, while capacity X is su¢ ciently
small such that x￿
n = X=n for all n ￿ 1. We want to show that a sale of assets (￿rms)
to a larger buyer makes the supplier strictly worse o⁄. As under the previous bargaining
solution, this is a stronger requirement than the requirement that a larger buyer obtains
a discount.
22Suppose therefore that buyer i sells r ￿rms to buyer j, where rj ￿ ri ￿ r. We denote
the payo⁄s under the original market structure by V ￿
i and V ￿
j , while those under the




j. (Note that V
￿
i = 0 holds trivially










Using (24) and substituting C(x) = cx, (25) transforms to the requirement
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(N ￿ ri + r)R
￿
X
N ￿ ri + r
￿
+ (N ￿ rj ￿ r)R
￿
X
N ￿ rj ￿ r
￿￿
(26)












































which ￿nally holds by the assumed strict concavity of R(x).
It remains to extend Proposition 5. For this we ￿rst have to rede￿ne the change in






i + V ￿
j ). Substituting from the previous results and using that R(x) = x(1 ￿  x), we
thus have that










As in the proof of Proposition 5, 0 <  ￿ <  ￿ and ￿ < 0 then imply that ￿ is strictly
higher under ￿ than under ￿. Consequently, the respective threshold K is strictly higher
under the more concentrated market structure.
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